Monday morning. The accountant opens 1C — “file is corrupted.” On the desktop there’s a text file: your data has been encrypted, transfer such-and-such an amount in cryptocurrency. That’s ransomware, and we get these calls in Tashkent regularly. Here’s how it gets in, how to protect yourself at a reasonable cost, and what to do if it’s already too late.
How infections really happen
Not “hackers broke in.” In the vast majority of cases, an employee opens the door:
- An email attachment — “Invoice for payment,” “Reconciliation statement,” “Resume” — containing a document with a macro, or an archive with an executable file. Accounting is target number one, because it opens dozens of these files every day.
- Remote Desktop (RDP) exposed to the internet with a simple password. Bots try passwords around the clock; “Admin123” is cracked in minutes.
- Old vulnerabilities — a server that hasn’t been updated since 2019, a router with the factory password.
- A USB stick from a home computer, a Windows “activator” downloaded by an employee.
From there, the malware encrypts everything the employee’s account can reach: local drives, network folders, connected external drives holding the “backup.” If the employee has administrator rights — the entire server.
What actually protects you
Antivirus is necessary, but it stops fewer than half of modern ransomware strains: they use legitimate Windows tools. What works is a combination of measures, each closing off its own path:
- User permissions. Employees work without administrator rights. Malware launched by a regular user can’t disable protection or reach the server. This is free and delivers the most.
- Isolated backups. Copies that can’t be seen from workstations: a separate server with separate passwords, off-site copies, snapshots that can’t be deleted. If you’re infected, you restore in hours instead of negotiating with extortionists.
- A closed perimeter. No RDP exposed to the internet — only via VPN. A router with up-to-date firmware and changed passwords.
- Updates. Windows, servers, routers, 1C — on a schedule, not “someday.”
- Two-factor authentication for email, VPN and cloud services. A stolen password stops being a key.
- Employee training. Half an hour once a quarter, plus simulated phishing emails. After two or three rounds, the share of people who open the “supplier invoice” drops several times over.
If it’s already happened: the first hours
- Disconnect the infected computer from the network — pull the cable, turn off Wi-Fi. Don’t shut the computer down: encryption keys may still be in its memory.
- Disconnect the server and network storage until the scope is clear. An hour of downtime is better than an encrypted server.
- Don’t pay. Statistically, a quarter of those who pay never get a working key, and half get infected again — you’re now on the list of “payers.”
- Call your IT provider before anyone starts “cleaning” with antivirus: traces of the infection are needed to understand where it came from.
- Identify the entry point: whose email, whose computer, whether RDP was exposed. Until it’s closed, restoring is pointless.
- Restore from backup onto a clean system. If there’s no backup, check whether this ransomware variant can be decrypted for free (public decryptors exist for older versions).
- Change all passwords, including email and online banking: ransomware often steals data first and encrypts it afterward.
What it costs
For a company with 20–30 workstations, the six measures above amount to a few days of engineering work plus a backup server in a data center. This is included in our Standard plan or can be arranged as a standalone information security service. Recovering from an infection without backups means weeks of downtime and, often, years of lost data. The comparison speaks for itself.